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I.

INTRODUCTION

Mary Kay is an iconic direct sales company, and many women aspire to

gain the financial benefits derived from selling its cosmetics.' The Mary Kay
makeover business currently generates nearly $4 billion in revenue per year,
by way of approximately 3.5 million independent saleswomen. 2 Among that

sales force, a small percentage generate enough revenue to qualify for some
of the most prized perquisites that are available to those at the highest Mary
Kay sales levels.3 These benefits include not only the emblematic pink
Cadillac but also other benefits such as the right to participate in programs
that provide financial payments to the saleswoman once she ceases to sell

* Professor of Law and Faculty Director of the Graduate Tax Program, Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law. I wish to thank Les Book for inviting me to analyze
the Peterson case for the blog Procedurally Taxing (www.procedurallytaxing.com) and
reviewing my blog commentary. I also wish to express appreciation to PT blog-contributor,
Keith Fogg, for his contribution to the title of this article. I am grateful to my colleagues who
attended the summer workshop where I discussed this paper and provided helpful feedback. I
am especially grateful to Teri Ravenell for reading countless drafts and her always-insightful
comments.
1. Mary Kay, FORBES (Dec. 17, 2019), htps://www.forbes.com/companies/marykay/#
248cd2362bc9 [https://penna.cc/5XJY-P9FL].
2. Id.
3.
See Peterson v. Comm'r, 827 F.3d 968, 970 (11th Cir. 2016).
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Mary Kay cosmetics.4 These latter benefits (the post-sales career payments)
have recently been the subject of a significant tax dispute, reviving a
longstanding controversy: what controls the tax consequences of a
transaction-the transaction's form or its substance? 5
The answer to this question depends, of course. 6 While tax literature and
case law commonly assert that a transaction's substance controls over mere
form or label, the reality is more nuanced.' Whether form or substance
controls depends on which party is asserting one or the other, the context of
the dispute, and the court before which the dispute is adjudicated.8
Often, the ability to successfully argue that the nature of a transactionrather than contractual terms, labels, legal structure, or return
characterization-should determine the tax consequences is limited to the
government.9 In this way, the substance-over-form doctrine is asymmetrical,
with its benefits principally flowing to the government.
Sometimes, taxpayers succeed in asserting substance over form; although
to do so, they often must meet a higher standard of proof. 0 In response, the
4.

See

id; Sell Mary Kay, MARY KAY,

https://www.marykay.com/en-us/sell-mary-kay

[https://perma.cc/X34M-URGE].
5.
Ray A. Knight & Lee G. Knight, Substance over Form: The Cornerstone of Our Tax
System or a Lethal Weapon in the IRS's Arsenal?, 8 AKRON TAX J. 91, 92 (1991) ("[N]either
the courts nor the IRS have provided a generally applicable answer to the question of whether
substance should prevail over form or form should prevail over substance.").
6.
This is the paradigmatic safe answer to almost any legal question.
7.
See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935); W. Md. Ry. Co. v.
Comm'r, 33 F.2d 695, 698 (4th Cir. 1929); BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 4.3.6, Westlaw (database updated 2020); Kenneth
L. Harris, Should There Be a "Form Consistency"Requirement? DanielsonRevisited, 78 TAXES
88, 89 (2000) ("It is a fundamental principle of federal income taxation that the tax consequences
of a transaction turn on the 'substance' and not the 'form' of the transaction."); Michael E.
Baillif, The Return Consistency Rule: A ProposalforResolving the Substance-Form Debate, 48

TAX LAW. 289, 289 (1995); J. Bruce Donaldson, When Substance-over-Form Argument is
Available to the Taxpayer, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 41, 41 (1964) ("The gospel that the substance of
a transaction, rather than mere form, controls the tax incidents is accepted by all.").
8.
See infra Part II.
9.
Donaldson, supra note 7, at 42 ("A considerable body of thought exists that the
doctrine of substance is a sword available to the Commissioner, but that it may not be used as a
shieldby the taxpayer."); see also Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 477-78 (1940). For purposes
of this Article, the "nature of a transaction" refers to a transaction's substance, while the "tax
consequences" of the transaction refer to a transaction's form.
10. See Donaldson, supra note 7, at 45; Harris, supra note 7, at 89; Bartels v.
Birmingham, 322 U.S. 126, 131-32 (1947); Throndson v. Comm'r, 457 F.2d 1022, 1024-25
(9th Cir. 1972); Comm'r v. Proctor Shop, 82 F.2d 792, 795 (9th Cir. 1936); Shaw v. Comm'r,
59 T.C. 375, 383-84, 387 (1972); see also Baillif, supra note 7, at 300 (noting that the "strong
proof rule" allows a taxpayer to disavow form "if, and only if, she can establishby 'strong proof'
the nature of the transaction's true substance which she claims differs from the form initially
adopted" (quoting Coleman v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 178, 204 (1986))). Under the Weinert
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government will invariably invoke one of the rules that comprise the NonDisavowal Doctrine." These rules prohibit taxpayers from disavowing the
form chosen for their transaction, even if the transaction would be taxed
differently if the substance were assessed on its merits.1 2 This embraces issues
of "form" including contracts that specify how certain payments should be
characterized or classified for tax purposes.13
One such non-disavowal rule is the so-called Danielson rule.' 4 The
Danielson rule binds parties to the form of their transaction regardless of the
underlying substance, unless the taxpayer can show "proof which[,] in an
action between the parties to the agreement[,] would be admissible to alter
that construction or to show its unenforceability because of mistake, undue
influence, fraud, duress, etc."
However, imagine entering into a transaction that gives one partyperhaps the party with significantly more negotiating power-the ability to

unilaterally amend the contract at any time and in any manner post hoc.
Further, assume the contract is subsequently amended in a way that, for the
first time, explicitly characterizes the nature of the contract for tax purposes.
Should the new amended form of the contract control the tax consequences,
binding the non-amending party who had no opportunity to object to the
amendment? Has the non-amending party forfeited all rights to make an
argument on the merits because they agreed to the unilateral amendment
clause ex ante? The Eleventh Circuit answered both questions affirmatively
in a recent case of first impression, Petersonv. Commissioner.16

In this case, Christine Peterson, who rose to the highest sales levels of
Mary Kay, elected to participate in two programs offered by Mary Kay that

standard a little-used variation on the strong proof rule taxpayers are most likely to be
successful if they provide a non-tax justification asserting substance over form in a consistent
manner. Est. of Weinert v. Comm'r, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961).
11. See Emily Cauble, Reforming the Non-DisavowalDoctrine, 35 VA. TAX REV. 439,
441 (2016) ("Courts' resistance to taxpayers' attempts to assert that the substance of their
transactions should prevail over form has been named the 'Non-Disavowal Doctrine."').
12. See id. at 440-41.
13. See Baillif, supra note 7, at 294.
14. Comm'r v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967) (establishing the Danielson

rule).
15. Id. The Danielson rule was controversial when it was judicially accepted, and it
received some immediate academic attention but has been largely ignored for the last twenty
years. See, e.g., Comment, The Danielson Rule on the Tax Consequences of a Covenant Not to

Compete, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (1968). There are some sound equitable and administrative
justifications for the Danielson rule and other non-disavowal rules, such as preventing posttransactional tax planning by taxpayers and deterring whipsaw of the government, but the rule
was expanded too far in Peterson.For further discussion of the Petersondecision, see infra Part
III.
16. 827 F.3d 968 (11th Cir. 2016).
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would provide her with payments once she ceased selling its cosmetics.' 7

There was no upfront agreement as to allocations, labels, or characterizations
of those payments, but each of the contract agreements contained a unilateral
amendment clause allowing Mary Kay to "amend, modify or terminate" the
agreements "at any time and in any manner."1 8 Several years later, Mary Kay

unilaterally amended the agreements to explicitly characterize the payments
as deferred compensation.1 9 This negatively affected Peterson's tax
consequences, so she sought the tax court's determination that her payments
under the contracts "constituted consideration for ending her Mary Kay
businesses and her agreement not to compete with Mary Kay" rather than
deferred compensation. 20 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) opposed,

advocating for the court to use the Danielson rule to bind Peterson to the
contract terms and characterize the payments as deferred compensation
regardless of the true nature of the payments. 2' Ultimately, the majority of an
Eleventh Circuit panel concluded that the Danielson rule applied. 22

No other court has applied the Danielson rule to bind a taxpayer to
contract terms added post hoc via a unilateral modification. 23 In fact, over the
last twenty years, there has been little academic discussion of the Danielson
rule. 24 This Article considers the Danielson rule in light of Peterson and
argues that it is an unjustifiable expansion of tax procedure and should not be
followed in other circuits. Part II discusses the substance-over-form and nondisavowal doctrines generally, considering the Danielson rule in particular.
Then, Part III examines the recent expansion of the Danielson rule in

Peterson. Part IV considers the ramifications of this expansion, while Part V
concludes that the Danielson rule, as well as other non-disavowal doctrines,
should be appropriately constrained. At a minimum, this Article concludes
that contracts of adhesion and changes due to unilateral amendment clauses
should not bind a subordinate party for tax purposes.

17. Id. at 980.
18. Id. at 994 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 978
(majority opinion).
19. Id. at 981. The amendments made no substantive changes to the agreements. Id
20. Id. at 983-84. On the other hand, as deferred compensation, the payments were
deductible to Mary Kay and thus the characterization was beneficial to Mary Kay. Id. at 980.
21. Id. at 988.
22. Id. at 993.
23. See Michael S.J. Lozich, The ContinuingApplication of the Danielson Rule: Insilco
Corp. v. United States, 49 TAx LAW. 769, 775-76 (1996); see also infra Section III.A.
24. The only serious consideration of the Danielson rule is found in a pre-Petersonarticle.
See Baillif, supra note 7, at 306-10.
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THE CLASSIC FOUNDATION

In tax law, there are two commonly accepted broad categories of doctrines
that can be applied to assess the tax consequences of a transaction: the
substance-over-form doctrine and, its opposite, the non-disavowal doctrine. 25
These doctrines cannot be defined in precise legal terms because both are truly
an amalgamation of many other more targeted doctrines, all of which aim to
focus the analysis either on the underlying substance of a transaction or on its
form. 26 Nonetheless, instead of leading to robust and clearly delineated paths
of analysis, the result of these doctrines is often confusion about whether any
doctrine should apply and, if one does, about its precise legal elements. As
one commentator described, "[a]ll too often the courts, based on a visceral
reaction to the facts before them, arrive at a given holding which they proceed
to support by spooning out liberal portions of substance soup or form
fricassee." 27
A.

The Substance-Over-FormDoctrine

The substance-over-form doctrine has a long and rich history, beginning
not long after the enactment of the first modern income tax. 28 The 1935
landmark case of Gregory v. Helvering is most often cited in reference to this
doctrine. 29 In a holding favorable to the Commissioner, the Supreme Court
determined that a taxpayer could be taxed according to the substance of a
transaction where the substance varied from its legal form. 30
In Gregory, a solely owned corporation sought to distribute to its
shareholders certain appreciated shares in a nontaxable manner rather than as
a taxable ordinary dividend. 31 To achieve this result, the corporation created
a new subsidiary corporation to which it contributed the appreciated shares,
25. There are, of course, other analytical doctrines that can be used to assess the tax
consequences of a transaction that does not fall neatly within the confines of either the substanceover-form doctrine or the non-disavowal doctrine, but these two capture the most commonly
asserted doctrines. A full and complete analysis of all substance over form and non-disavowal
doctrines is beyond the scope of this Article.
26. After Gregory, courts have developed several more specific substance-over-form
doctrines, such as the business purpose doctrine, economic substance doctrine, step transaction
doctrine, and sham transaction doctrine. See generally BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, ¶ 4.3.
Variations of non-disavowal doctrines include not only the Danielson rule, but also the strong
proof rule, the duty of consistency, and the Weinert standard. See Baillif, supra note 7, at 294.
27. Baillif, supra note 7, at 311.
28. See, e.g., Weiss v. Stearn, 265 U.S. 242, 254 (1924).
29. 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935) (articulating the substance-over-form doctrine and
ancillary business purpose test).
30. Id. at 470.
31. Id. at 467.
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and only a few days later, the new subsidiary corporation was dissolved and
liquidated.3 2 The appreciated shares were then distributed to the shareholder
in a transaction that technically qualified as a nontaxable reorganization. 33 As
a result, when the taxpayer subsequently sold the appreciated shares, her
overall tax consequences were significantly less than if she had received the
appreciated shares as an ordinary dividend.3 4
The IRS assessed a tax deficiency on the basis that the reorganization was
not a true reorganization within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code
(the Code).35 The taxpayer argued "that since every element required by the
[nontaxable reorganization provision] is to be found in what was done, a
statutory reorganization was effected; and that the motive of the taxpayer
thereby to escape payment of a tax will not alter the result or make unlawful
what the statute allows."3 6 In its seminal statement, the Court acknowledged
"[t]he legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise
would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits,
cannot be doubted."37 However, the Court also went on to note that "the
question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax
motive, was the thing which the statute intended." 38 The Court then held:
Putting aside, then, the question of motive in respect of taxation
altogether, and fixing the character of the proceeding by what
actually occurred, what do we find? Simply an operation having no
business or corporate purpose[-]a mere device which put on the
form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real
character, and the sole object and accomplishment of which was the
consummation of a preconceived plan, not to reorganize a business
or any part of a business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares
to the petitioner ....
In these circumstances, the facts speak for themselves and are
susceptible of but one interpretation. The whole undertaking, though
conducted according to the terms of [the Code], was in fact an
elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a
32. Id.
33. Id. at 468.
34. Id. at 467. As an ordinary dividend, the proceeds would be subject to two levels of
tax: first at the corporate level and again at the individual level.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 468-69.
37. Id. at 469 (first citing United States v. Isham, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 496, 506 (1873);
then citing Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930); and then citing Jones
v. Helvering, 71 F.2d 214, 217 (D.C. 1934)).
38. Id.
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corporate reorganization, and nothing else. The rule which excludes
from consideration the motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the
situation, because the transaction[,] upon its face[,] lies outside the
plain intent of the statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice
above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all
serious purpose. 39

Like the Court in Gregory, most academic discussions regarding
substance over form occur in the income tax area, particularly in the business
context. However, the doctrine applies equally to other areas of tax law. For
example, the substance-over-form doctrine is commonly used to resolve
wealth transfer tax disputes where taxpayers enter into transactions that, in
form, are structured to avoid the estate tax but are, in substance, captured by
one of its provisions. 40

In Estate ofMaxwell, the Second Circuit addressed whether a transaction
should be treated as a sale followed by a leaseback, which would not be
subject to estate tax consequences, or as a gratuitous transfer with a retained
life estate, which would be subject to estate tax consequences. 41The decedent,
Lydia Maxwell, unquestionably structured the transaction as a saleleaseback. 42 The decedent conveyed her house to her son and daughter-in-law
(the "Maxwells") in exchange for a promissory note. 43 In essence, the
decedent was acting in a capacity similar to that of a bank receiving a
promissory note for funds borrowed to purchase a home. The decedent then
entered into another agreement, leasing the property back from the Maxwells
so she could continue living in the home. 44 On paper, this transaction appeared
to be a sale of the home, followed by a leaseback of the home. 45 The resulting
tax consequences of such a transaction would typically be limited to the
income tax system and not generally within the scope of the estate tax.46
Nonetheless, external facts suggested the nature of the transaction was a
retained life estate, which falls within the scope of the estate tax. 47 When
individuals die, their assets are included in their gross estate and taxed
39. Id. at 469-70.
40. See generally Jay A. Soled, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving Transfer Tax
Controversies, 42 B.C. L. REV. 587 (2001) (concluding that judicial doctrines should serve a
limited role in resolving tax controversies in which taxpayers plan their estates).
41. Est. of Maxwell v. Comm'r, 3 F.3d 591, 594 (2d Cir. 1993).
42. See id. at 594.
43. Id. at 592.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 592-93.
46. Typical federal income tax considerations would include whether decedent had any
gain on the sale of the home, whether she had any interest income, and whether the Maxwells
had any lease income or related deductions. See id.
47. See I.R.C. § 2036(a)(1).
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pursuant to the estate tax. 48 Under the retained life estate rule, taxpayers
cannot avoid the estate tax by giving away a remainder interest in their
property (e.g., a home) and simultaneously retaining a life estate interest.
When taxpayers die holding a life estate, their interest in the property is not
subject to the estate tax because they do not own the property, and, therefore,
cannot transfer any right therein to their heirs or beneficiaries-rather, their
interest in the property expires at death.49 However, similar to fee owners,
taxpayers owning a life estate can live in their home and enjoy their property,
and upon death, the property goes to a remainderman in a manner similar to a
beneficiary receiving a home via will. 50 Thus, retained life estates are viewed
as akin to will substitutes and any such property is subject to estate tax. 5
In Maxwell, the decedent did not retain a life estate expressly; she sold
her home. 52 However, the Tax Court considered that the decedent was eightytwo and had been diagnosed with cancer when she conveyed the home to the
Maxwells and contemporaneously executed a leaseback. 53 Considering these
facts together, the Tax Court concluded that the decedent transferred the home
with, at a minimum, an implied understanding she would be able to continue
to reside in the home until death. 54 In this way, she had, in substance, retained
a life estate in the home.
The Tax Court also concluded that the home sale was a sham because the
decedent regularly forgave the principal payments due under the note 55 and
her lease payments were structured to match the interest payments that the
Maxwells owed under the note. 56 Ultimately, the court found that the
combined effect was to ensure that, according to the terms of the promissory
note, the Maxwells would "at no time [be] called upon to pay any of the
principal" such that the effect of the rental payments was to "cancel out the
interest payments" and the effect of the will provision was to forgive any

48. See id. § 2031 (defining gross estate); id. § 2033 (including in decedents' gross estate
property that they own, to the extent of any interest they may have).
49. The estate tax is an excise tax on the transfer of property; thus, the tax does not attach
without an actual or constructive transfer. See id. § 2001.
50. See generally Note, Understanding the Measuring Life in the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 265 (examining how to measure life estates in property law).
51. I.R.C. § 2036.
52. Estate of Maxwell v. Comm'r, 3 F.3d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 1993).
53. Estate of Maxwell v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. 594, 602 (1992), aff'd, 3 F.3d 591 (2d Cir.
1993).
54. Id.
55. The court also considered that two days after the home sale, the decedent included a
provision in her will forgiving any unpaid balance the Maxwells owed under the note. Id
56. Maxwell, 3 F.3d at 592 ("Not only did the rent functionally cancel out the interest
payments made by the Maxwells, but the Maxwells were at no time called upon to pay any of
the principal.").
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unpaid balance.57 Thus, in substance, the transaction was not a sale followed
by a leaseback, but rather was the gift of a remainder interest in the home to
the Maxwells.58 The Tax Court summarized its holding as follows:
On this record, bearing in mind [the estate's] burden of proof, we
hold that, notwithstanding its form, the substance of the transaction
calls for the conclusion that decedent made a transfer to her son and
daughter-in-law with the understanding, at least implied, that she
would continue to reside in her home until her death, that the transfer
was not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth, and that the lease represented nothing
more than an attempt to add color to the characterizationof the
transactionas a bonafide sale.59

These cases typify the substance-over-form doctrine-cases in which the
IRS asserts that the form of a transaction should be disregarded and that the
court should assess the underlying substance to determine tax consequences.
The principal rationale for this doctrine is that the taxpayer chose the form of
the transaction. As such, the IRS should be able to assert that "the form does
not comport with the substance" of the transaction. 60 Generally, commentators
agree with this logic. 61 However, can taxpayers, having chosen the form of
the transaction they wanted to undertake, later disavow that chosen form and
assert a substantive argument? The answer is sometimes yes.62
Prior to 1967, taxpayers were more successful in arguing substance-over-

form. 63 In modern times, taxpayers who are successful in asserting that the
substance of a transaction should determine its tax consequences largely fall
57. Id.
58. See id. at 597 n.6 (distinguishing the Maxwells' situation from a Tax Court decision
that held a similar transaction constituted "a gift of a remainder interest" (quoting Deal v.
Comm'r, 29 T.C. 730, 736 (1958))). The Maxwells were obligated to pay, and did pay, certain
expenses associated with the property such as property taxes and insurance, but this was not
enough to overcome the gift nature of the transaction. See id. at 592.
59. Maxwell, 98 T.C. at 601 (emphasis added).
60. Donaldson, supra note 7, at 42; see also Harris, supra note 7, at 89 ("[T]here is . . a
fundamental notion that where the taxpayer, and not the government controls the facts, the
taxpayer should be restricted in its ability to assert that the substance and not the form controls
for tax purposes.").
61. See, e.g., BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 7, ¶ 4.3.3; Baillif, supra note 7, at 298-99.
62. See, e.g., Donaldson, supra note 7, at 42 ("It is the purpose and task of this article to
demonstrate that the substance-over-form argument is available to the taxpayer in an expanding
number of situations and with increasing and encouraging success."); Harris, supra note 7, at 89
(stating that a taxpayer may prevail on a substance over form argument depending on the
threshold rule applied by the court).
63. See generally Harris, supra note 7, at 90-93 (describing pre-Danielson case law
applying the substance-over-form doctrine).
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into one of two categories: (1) they have a valid non-tax reason for why the
particular form should be chosen, even if the substance of the transaction
should be viewed differently, 64 and (2) they have honestly and consistently
reported the transaction on tax returns according to the substance of the
transaction. 65 Additionally, if taxpayers can show "strong proof' either that
the form or agreement had "no basis in fact" and thus should not bind the
taxpayer 6 or that the form or agreement is unenforceable due to "mistake,
undue influence, fraud, duress, etc. [,]" they may be successful in rebutting the
non-disavowal doctrine. 67 Despite some wins, taxpayers often lose these
arguments and are held to their chosen form. 68
B.

The Non-DisavowalDoctrine and the Danielson Rule

As its name suggests, under the non-disavowal doctrine, taxpayers are
prevented from disavowing the form of a chosen transaction by arguing that
the underlying substance of the transaction should control instead. The
principal rationale is "that where the taxpayer, and not the government
controls the facts, the taxpayer should be restricted in its ability to assert that
the substance and not the form controls for tax purposes. . . "69 From the
government's perspective, the non-disavowal and substance-over-form
doctrines work together to allow the government (since it was not a party to
the original transaction) to tax the transaction in whatever manner it deems
best-form or substance.
To bolster this asymmetrical leverage, the government long argued for a
'

strict taxpayer non-disavowal principle. 70 This argument was rejected until it
found success with the Third Circuit in Danielson v. Commissioner.7

In Danielson, the stockholders of Butler County Loan Co. (Seller)
decided to sell the company to the Thrift Investment Corp. (Buyer) for $374

per share. 72 Buyer was responsible for drafting the sales agreement, and it
allocated $222 of the share price to the stock purchase and $152 of the share
64. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Proctor Shop, 82 F.2d 792, 793 (9th Cir. 1936). See generally
Cauble, supra note 11, at 450 (noting that taxpayers who provide a non-tax justification for the
transactional form selected are more likely to succeed at trial).
65. Harris, supra note 7, at 101 ("In a distinct line of cases .... the rule has developed
that a taxpayer is entitled to assert that the substance and not form of a transaction controls for
tax purposes so long as the taxpayer has honestly and consistently reported the substance of the
transaction."). This scenario is called "return consistency."
66. Id. at 92.
67. Comm'rv. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967); see infra Section II.B.
68. See infra Section II.B.
69. Harris, supra note 7, at 89.
70. Id. at 90.
71. Danielson, 378 F.2d at 778.
72. Id. at 772-73.
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price to the cost of the covenants not to compete. 73 This allocation provided
Buyer with favorable tax benefits. 74
When Seller noticed the allocation, "[it] questioned the unexpected and
large amounts allocated to the covenants not to compete."7 5 Buyer responded
that the allocations were to its tax advantage, but did not specify the result on
the amounts allocated to the covenants not to compete: more favorable capital
gains treatment for Buyer and taxable ordinary income for Seller (taxed at a
higher rate than capital gains). 76 Seller did not challenge or negotiate the
allocation.77 Rather, "[a]t the conclusion of a brief discussion of the allocation,
[Seller's attorney] advised [Seller] to sign the documents."7 8 After the sale,
Seller reported all profits as capital gains without regard to the sales agreement
allocations. 79 In response, the Commissioner asserted that Seller should have
reported the portion allocated to the covenant not to compete as ordinary
income.80
The Tax Court subsequently considered whether the terms of the sales
agreement contract should be controlling for tax purposes, even if the parties
did not meaningfully negotiate or bargain for those terms. 81 The government
"vigorously urge[d]" the court to "adopt a 'new rule' of law concerning the
treatment of such written covenants . . prevent[ing] either [the] contracting
party thereto or the respondent from subsequently attacking the stated
consideration in such agreements unless fraud, duress, or undue influence
existed at the time they were signed." 8 2 This argument was unsuccessful
before the Tax Court but effective before the Third Circuit on appeal.83
At the trial level, the Tax Court concluded the taxpayers provided "strong
proof' that the allocations in the purchase agreement had no "arguable
relationship with business reality" and no "independent basis in fact."8 4 Buyer
determined the purchase price allocations in a manner that suited its purposes
and without more substantial support such as a reliable valuation, negotiation,
or tax plan.85 The Tax Court concluded that, based on those facts, Seller
should not be bound by the purchase agreement even though it was aware of
73. Id. at 773.
74. Id.
75. Danielson v. Comnn'r, 44 T.C. 549, 555 (1965), rev 'd, Danielson, 378 F.2d at 779.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 557.
82. Id. at 555; see also Harris, supra note 7, at 93.
83. Danielson, 44 T.C. at 555 ("We are unwilling to abdicate our judicial responsibility
of examining the substance of a transaction. We are not bound by its form.").
84. Id. at 556.
85. Danielson, 44 T.C. at 557.
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the terms and executed the purchase agreement documents despite this
awareness. 86

The Third Circuit disagreed and articulated what is now referred to as the
Danielson rule:

[Parties] can challenge the tax consequences of [their] agreement as
construed by the Commissioner only by adducing proof which in an
action between the parties to the agreement would be admissible to alter
that construction or to show its unenforceability because of mistake,
undue influence, fraud, duress, etc. 87
The Danielson rule is a more stringent non-disavowal rule. When it

applies, it binds parties to the form of their transaction regardless of the
underlying substance, unless the taxpayer can show admissible proof to "alter
that construction or to show its unenforceability because of mistake, undue
influence, fraud, duress, etc." 88 Application of the rule is limited by the need
for an "agreement" between the parties. Thus, for the rule to apply, there must
be a contract that is binding and unambiguous between the parties. 89
In Danielson, the Third Circuit justified the new rule with equitable and

administrative concerns. Of the former, the court noted that failing to bind a
party to its initial characterization "would be in effect to grant, at the instance
of a party, a unilateral reformation of the contract with a resulting unjust
enrichment . . nullify[ing] the reasonably predictable tax consequences of
the agreement to the other party thereto." 90 Of the latter, the court noted that
the rule would avoid the government's need to take action against both parties
to a contract-even if only one party raised an issue-lest the government risk
not being able to collect all the taxes properly due (i.e., the potential
"whipsaw" scenario). 9 1

86. Id. at 558.
87. Comm'rv. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967).
88. Peterson v. Comm'r, 827 F.3d 968, 987 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Plante v. Comm'r, 168 F.3d 1279, 1280-81 (11th Cir. 1999)).
89. N. Am. Rayon Corp. v. Comm'r, 12 F.3d 583, 589 (6th Cir. 1993); Throndsonv.
Comm'r, 457 F.2d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding the Danielson rule did not apply when
the covenant not to compete in dispute was invalid).
90. Danielson, 378 F.2d at 775.
91. Rayon, 12 F.3d at 587. The whipsaw scenario occurs when "the Commissioner [is]
required to litigate against both parties to the agreement in order to protect tax revenues." Id.
(first citing Schatten v. United States, 746 F.2d 319, 322 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); and then
citing Danielson, 378 F.2d at 775). The Danielson rule serves to prevent the whipsaw problem
"[b]y allowing the Commissioner to hold taxpayers to the terms of their agreement." Id. (citing
Spector v. Comm'r, 641 F.2d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 1981)).
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Danielson's strict standard was controversial. Its rule has been adopted
by some jurisdictions (almost half), 92 rejected by others, 93 and in some cases
has yet to be commented on at all. 94 In the latter situation, the courts generally
apply the "strong proof' rule. 95 Recently, a divided panel in the Eleventh
Circuit revived the debate surrounding the role and scope of the Danielson
rule. 96 In Peterson v. Commissioner, the court-facing an issue of first

impression-utilized the rule in a factual setting departing from the typical
application of Danielson and significantly expanded its scope. 97
III. A MARY KAY MAKEOVER
A.

An Overview of Peterson v. Commissioner

Peterson is an interesting case from both a substantive and procedural
perspective. The principal substantive issue was the tax characterization of

certain payments. 98 Procedurally, the majority decided the case by first relying
on the Danielson rule in a factual setting that departs from the typical
Danielson scenario and then nonetheless proceeding to a consideration of the
underlying substantive issues. 99
In Peterson, the taxpayer (Peterson) was an independent contractor

associated with Mary Kay.1 00 Peterson irrevocably elected to participate in
two programs offered by Mary Kay that would make payments once she
ceased selling Mary Kay cosmetics.101 There was no upfront agreement as to

allocations, labels, or characterizations of those payments. 0 2 Each of the
contract agreements, however, contained a unilateral amendment clause.1 03
92. The Danielson rule has been adopted by the Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and Federal
Circuits and has been positively considered by the Second and Fourth Circuits but not officially
adopted. See, e.g., United States v. Bergbauer, 602 F.3d 569, 577 n.10 (4th Cir. 2010); Michael
Baillif, When (and Where) Does the Danielson Rule Limit Taxpayers Arguing Substance over
Form'?, 82 J. TAx'N 362, 363-64 (1995).

93. The rule has been rejected by the First, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. See Baillif, supra
note 92, at 364-65.
94. The Eighth and Tenth Circuits have yet to comment on the rule. See id at 365.
95. Grace Soyon Lee, What's in A Name?: The Role of Danielson in the Taxation of
Credit CardSecuritizations, 62 BAYLOR L. REv. 110, 148-49 (2010).
96. See Peterson v. Comm'r, 827 F.3d 968, 987 (11th Cir. 2016); Comm'rv. Danielson,
378 F.2d at 775 (3d Cir. 1967).
97. See Peterson, 827 F.3d at 987; see also United States v. Fort, 638 F.3d 1334, 133738 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining the circumstance in which the Danielson rule should apply).
98. Peterson, 827 F.3d at 989.
99. Id. at 988 n.30.
100. Id. at 980.
101. Id. at 980-81.
102. Id. at 996 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
103. Id.
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This clause allowed Mary Kay to "amend, modify or terminate" the
agreements "at any time and in any manner."1

04

Mary Kay subsequently

exercised its rights to unilaterally amend the agreements in a manner that, for
the first time, explicitly characterized the nature of the payments as deferred
compensation-the amendments made no substantive changes.1 05
Peterson disputed the deferred compensation characterization and its
resulting tax consequences (payments subject to self-employment tax).1 06

Instead, Peterson averred that the payments were either made in consideration
for ending her association with Mary Kay or her agreement not to compete,
neither of which were subject to self-employment tax.1 07 The Commissioner
asserted a tax deficiency for self-employment tax among other things, and
Peterson found herself in Tax Court. 108 Ultimately, a majority of an Eleventh
Circuit panel concluded that the Danielson rule applied to bind Peterson to
the characterization provided by the amended agreements, while the dissent
objected to the rule's use in the context of a post hoc unilateral
modification. 109
The facts of Peterson depart from the paradigmatic Danielson-rule fact

pattern. The typical scenario to which the Danielson rule applies involves
parties that agreed to structure a transaction in a particular form followed by
one of the parties subsequently challenging the tax characterization of that
form based on the underlying substance of the transaction. For example,
assume someone sells a business and the contract allocates a larger portion of
the proceeds to a non-compete agreement (ordinary income to the seller) and
a smaller portion of the proceeds to a sale of capital assets (capital gains to the
seller). If the seller subsequently disputes the allocation in order to lower the
amount of taxes owed and claims that the true nature of the transaction (i.e.,
its economic substance) was predominantly a sale of capital assets, the
Danielson rule would step in to prevent the disavowal of the agreed upon

contract allocation.i10
No other court has applied the Danielson rule outside of that context until
Peterson. This case not only significantly expands the scope of the Danielson

104. Id. at 978 (majority opinion).
105. Id. at 981.
106. Id. at 989.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 983.
109. Id. at 993; id. at 994 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment
in part).
110. The Danielson rule has been utilized in situations beyond this archetypal case
including "divorce settlements, liquidation of partnership interests, asset sale agreements, stock
purchase and repurchase agreements, stock redemptions, employment contracts, dealer
commission agreements, compromise settlements and releases, sale of real property,
assignments of leases, and leases." Lozich, supra note 23, at 772 (1996).
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rule but also signals the judiciary's modern views of consent and contracts of
adhesion more generally.
B.

A Closer Look at Peterson

This Section takes a closer look at Peterson-the facts, the majority
holding, and the dissent. In Peterson, the Eleventh Circuit significantly

expanded the reach of the Danielson rule based on a distinctive set of facts.
Peterson was an independent contractor for Mary Kay, who rose to the highest
level of the Mary Kay sales network and became an extremely successful
National Sales Director (NSD).I" Mary Kay offers NSDs the opportunity to
participate in two different programs that provide certain monetary benefits to

the NSD once she is no longer actively associated with Mary Kay: the Family
Security Program and the Great Futures Program."1

2

These programs provide

benefits similar to retirement plans and are unique in the direct sales
industry-providing financial benefits to non-employee, independent
contractors after they are no longer associated with Mary Kay." 3
Under the Family Security Program, payment amounts are based on a
formula, calculated by averaging the three highest years of domestic sales
commissions from the NSD's last five years of active association with Mary
Kay."

4

Payments pursuant to the Great Futures Program are collected from

commissions on current sales made by the former NSD's foreign sales
teams." 5 In other words, while Family Security Program payments are
determined with reference to past sales activity, Great Futures Program
payments are determined with reference to ongoing sales activity after the
NSD is no longer associated with Mary Kay. In exchange for receiving
payments under the programs, the NSD agrees to sever her NSD agreement

with Mary Kay at either age fifty-five or sixty-five and agrees to certain noncompete covenants.ii 6 Nothing in the program agreements characterized the
nature of the program payments prior to 2008."?
In October 2004, Congress enacted a new Code section: § 409A.iis In

brief,

§ 409A governs the taxation of nonqualified deferred compensation

111. Peterson, 827 F.3d at 980.
112. Id. at 974, 976. The Family Security program was established in 1991, and the Great
Futures Program was established in 2005. Id.
113. Id. at 993.
114. Id. at 974.
115. Id. at 977.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 996 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
118. See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885(a), 118 Stat.
1418, 1634-39 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 409A); Joy Sabino Mullane, Incidence and
Accidents: Regulation ofExecutive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 13 LEWIS & CLARK

L. REv. 485, 526-31 (2009) (discussing the history and function of § 409A).
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plans. It provides that participants failing to satisfy

§ 409A's requirements are

immediately subject to current taxation, plus interest, on all compensation
deferred under the plan to the extent the compensation is not subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture or has not been previously included in gross
income.1 9 Section 409A also imposes an additional twenty percent tax on any
non-complying compensation included in the participant's income for the
taxable year.120
Section 409A was so complicated that, although enacted in 2004, it did
not go into effect until 2009.121 In anticipation of its effectiveness, the

agreements for both the Family Security Program and the Great Futures
Program were modified in 2008 pursuant to a unilateral amendment clause
that allowed Mary Kay to make any change to the agreements at any time.1 22

The amendments provided that the programs were intended to be nonqualified
deferred compensation arrangements in compliance with

§ 409A.1 23 Mary

Kay claimed it always viewed the plan's payments as deferred compensation
(deductible by Mary Kay) and undertook the amendments to protect
participating NSDs from the consequences of not complying with

§ 409A.1 24

Peterson participated in both of the programs offered by Mary Kay, and
thus began receiving payments pursuant to the programs once she ceased her
involvement with Mary Kay in 2009.125 The tax characterization of these

payments was the principal issue of the case-whether they were deferred
compensation payments subject to self-employment tax or some other type of

payment not subject to self-employment tax. While the Commissioner argued
the payments were deferred compensation, Peterson argued the payments

were consideration for "ending her Mary Kay businesses and her agreement
not to compete with Mary Kay post-retirement." 126

119. See I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1) (including all deferred compensation under the plan unless it
is "subject to substantial risk of forfeiture and not previously included in gross income");
id. § 409A(a)(1)(B)(ii) (defining the interest rate as one percentage point above the
underpayment rate).
120. Id. § 409A(a)(1)(B)(i)(II); see also id. § 4999(a) ("There is hereby imposed on any
person who receives an excess parachute payment a tax equal to 20 percent of the amount of
such payment.").
121. See I.R.S. Notice 2007-86, 2007-2 C.B. 990; I.R.S. Notice 2007-78, 2007-2 C.B. 780.
The IRS repeatedly issued transition relief delaying the date on which nonqualified deferred
compensation plans had to comply with § 409A. See also I.R.S. Notice 2007-86, 2007-2 C.B.
990; I.R.S. Notice 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1287.
122. Peterson, 827 F.3d at 979.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 979-80.
125. Id. at 981.
126. Id. at 989.
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The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner and concluded the program
payments were deferred compensation; therefore, Peterson was liable for selfemployment tax.1 27 On appeal, the majority similarly concluded in holding:
On the facts of this case and controlling law, we hold the percentage
commissions received by Peterson, a retired NSD, under the Mary
Kay Family Program and Futures Program are subject to self-

employment tax[] because they are classified specifically as deferred
compensation, derived from her prior association with Mary Kay.1 28
What is not entirely clear in Petersonis whether the language "classified
specifically as deferred compensation, derived from her prior association with
Mary Kay[,]" is referring to a conclusion reached by application of the
Danielson rule or by substantive legal analysis. This lack of clarity stems from
the opinion's initial focus on and use of the Danielson rule, followed by a
consideration of the underlying substantive issues. Essentially, in a less direct
fashion, the Eleventh Circuit found that not only were the payments deferred
compensation pursuant to the Danielson rule, but even if the rule were not

applicable, the payments would still be considered deferred compensation.
This is the complete opposite of the Tax Court's approach, which first focused
on the substantive deferred compensation issue before giving a nod to the
Danielson rule.129 The dissent, on the other hand, opposed the application of
the Danielson rule on the unique facts of Peterson and also disagreed on the

merits with the characterization of the payments as deferred compensation. 130
All tax professionals agree, however, that for self-employment tax to be
due, the taxpayer's income must be "derived . . from any trade or business
carried on by [the taxpayer]." 3i The specific substantive question in Peterson
was whether the program payments were "derived" from the taxpayer's Mary
Kay business-i.e., deferred compensation or other income captured by selfemployment tax-or were instead paid to acquire Peterson's Mary Kay
business and secure a non-compete agreement. 132

After providing a lengthy factual background, the majority quickly delved
into its summary Danielson analysis. The majority first noted that the 2008
amendments to the Mary Kay programs labeled payments under the programs

127. Id. at 984.
128. Id. at 993. The majority consisted of Judge Fay with Judge Middlebrooks sitting by
designation.
129. Id. at 989; id. at 993 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment
in part).
130. Id. at 996. (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
131. I.R.C. § 1402(a).
132. Peterson, 827 F.3d at 989.
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as "deferred compensation."1 33 As such, the majority then concluded that,
pursuant to the Danielson rule, contract terms control the treatment of
program payments.1 34 The majority was unconcerned with the post hoc

unilateral nature of the amendments, indicating that Peterson's initial assent
to the agreements at the time of contract formation "permitting Mary Kay to
amend [the programs] prospectively" meant that she "consented to the 2008
Amendments . . expressly characteriz[ing] the Family Program and Futures
Program payments as 'deferred compensation' under a nonqualified
compensation plan pursuant to

§ 409A of the Internal Revenue Code . . ."135

Thus, "the Danielson rule [is applicable and] requires . .

Peterson[] [be]

bound by the characterization of her 2009 Mary Kay, post-retirement Program

payments as deferred compensation, making them subject to self-employment
tax."1 36
The dissent was troubled, however, by the fact that Peterson never
explicitly agreed to the characterization of the payments as deferred
compensation. After examining the history and purpose of the Danielson rule,

the dissent concluded the majority's expansion of the rule was unwarranted
and unadvisable:
[T]he agreements Peterson executed to enter Mary Kay's programs

empowered Mary Kay to make unilateral amendments to the
Programs. Years after Peterson and Mary Kay entered into the

agreements, Mary Kay invoked that power to unilaterally
characterize payments made under the Programs as "deferred
compensation." The Danielson rule has never been applied on facts
like these. Nor should it be.1 37
The first justification for the Danielson rule is preventing "a party from

unjustly enriching itself by unilaterally altering the intended tax consequences
of a transaction after consummation."1 38 However, in the Peterson context,
applying the Danielson rule "stands th[is] . .. [justification] on its head."1 39
This should be readily apparent because Peterson "made no attempt to alter
the express terms of the transaction that she and Mary Kay agreed to at
formation; she merely [sought] review and enforcement of the terms of the
Programs themselves."1 4 0 Indeed, "[o]nly Mary Kay . . . arguably attempted
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
140.
141.

Id. at 987.
Id. at 989.
Id. at 987.
Id. at 989.
Id. at 994 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part).
Id. at 997.
Id. at 998.
Id.
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to alter the tax consequences flowing from the substantive terms of the
Programs to which the parties agreed."141 As the dissent noted:
In these circumstances, applying the Danielson rule does not prevent

a unilateral, post-consummation contract reformation. Instead, the
Majority's application of the rule insulates Mary Kay's unilateral, ex

postfacto characterization of the Program payments from meaningful
review. As a result, today's decision encourages parties to risk
litigation by attempting unilateral, post-consummation contract
reformations to avoid the tax consequences of their transactions.
Another result of today's decision is that parties will be less certain
about the tax consequences of a transaction where the agreement
contains a unilateral amendment provision-whichever party has the
power to amend the agreement will be able to alter those
consequences by simply re-characterizing the transaction after
consummation.1 42

Regarding the second justification, the dissent thoroughly analyzed the
role of the Danielson rule in preventing whipsaw litigation. It began by
reminding the majority that the intent of the Danielson rule was never to

"entirely eliminate the need for the Commissioner to ever pursue litigation
against both parties to an agreement. ...

"143 This was readily apparent in the

language of the rule itself, which contains an exception in the form of a carveout in situations "where a taxpayer . . 'adduc[es] proof which in an action
between the parties to the agreement would be admissible to alter [the
Commissioner's] construction or to show its44unenforceability because of
mistake, undue influence, fraud, duress, etc.'"1
The dissent acknowledged that the Danielson rule serves a valuable, progovernment, and protective function:
[The] rule eliminates the need for the Commissioner to pursue
litigation against both parties in a very particular set of cases. Where
a taxpayer initially agrees to an express contractual characterization

or form and later attempts to re-characterize the term or form, the
Danielson rule acts as a prophylactic to prevent the IRS from having

142. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 999.
144. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Comm'r v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d
Cir. 1967)).
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to pursue the taxpayer's counterparty out of a concern that a court

will agree with the taxpayer's ex post facto re-characterization.14 5
Nevertheless, the dissent emphasized the limits of the Danielson rule by
recognizing it does not apply in cases where "the taxpayer does not seek to

avoid an express contractual term or form."1 46 Rather, in those cases, the
Commissioner must litigate the issue of tax deficiency "on the merits,"
identifying inconsistencies between the parties' arguments and assessing tax

deficiencies amongst several individuals on the same issue.147 In the dissent's
words: "the Commissioner must go ahead and pursue whipsaw
litigation . . . to protect the public . . . from any whipsaw effect in cases
'[with] an accepted legal basis' for asserting a single tax deficiency against
multiple parties."1

48

Finally, the dissent concluded by identifying the critical facts that
distinguished Peterson's situation from the typical Danielson scenario:
Here, Peterson never expressly agreed to a characterization of the
Program payments as "deferred compensation" in the Danielson

sense. Instead, as the Commissioner implicitly acknowledges, there
is a reasonable legal basis to conclude that Program payments are
either (1) deferred compensation, in which case Peterson is liable for
the tax deficiency; or (2) payments for a covenant not to compete, in
which case Mary Kay would be responsible for incorrectly deducting
the payments on its tax returns. In these circumstances, I would hold
that the Commissioner may not rely on the Danielson rule in lieu of

pursuing actual whipsaw litigation to resolve a genuine dispute about
whether Peterson or Mary Kay is responsible for the tax deficiency
at issue. The Majority's contrary conclusion, in my opinion, does not
vindicate the rule's prophylactic purpose of preventing unnecessary
whipsaw litigation; it prevents necessary whipsaw litigation.1 49

After their Danielson rule discussions, both opinions considered the tax
characterization issue on its merits. This aspect of the case is also interesting,
as once again there was some disagreement among the panel as to whether the
payments were of a nature that would subject them to self-employment tax.
The narrow substantive issue was whether the post-retirement payments were
145. Id.; see also Patterson v. Comm'r, 810 F.2d 562, 572 (6th Cir. 1987) ("The Danielson
rule can only be meaningfully applied in those cases where a specific amount has been mutually
allocated to the covenant as expressed in the contract.").
146. Peterson, 827 F.3d at 999.
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Gerardo v. Comm'r, 552 F.2d 549, 555 (3d Cir. 1977)).
149. Id. at 999-1000.
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"derived" from Peterson's Mary Kay business. Consideration of this issue in
the context of the direct sales industry is also unique and worthwhile, but
beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, the upshot is that the majority
concluded the program payments were deferred compensation, while the
dissent disagreed. First, the dissent concluded that the Family Security
Program payments were still subject to self-employment tax because the
payment amount was directly tied to and derived from the quality of
Peterson's prior Mary Kay labor. 10 Then, the dissent further held that the
Great Futures Program payments were not subject to self-employment tax

because those payment amounts were "entirely dependent on the quality of
other, non-retired Mary Kay laborers.""'
IV. WAS THE MAKEOVER A HIT OR MISS?

The Eleventh Circuit did not need to rely on the Danielson rule, and in so

doing, it significantly expanded the rule's reach. The court could have reached
its conclusion based solely on a substantive analysis. Further, the majority
insinuated that if Mary Kay had not labeled the program payments as deferred
compensation, the government could decide the tax consequences of the
payments by analyzing their substance to determine whether § 409A
applied.i1 2 In fact, absent Mary Kay's subsequent characterization, the
government would need to independently determine the nature of the
payments.1 53 Of course, because Mary Kay did indeed exercise its unilateral
amendment power to label the payments as deferred compensation, the
government asserted Peterson was estopped from challenging that label based
on a substantive examination of the payments. This highlights the lopsided
nature of the Danielson rule combined with the substance-over-form

doctrine-both of which are one-way streets favoring the government. i54
There are two primary justifications for the Danielson rule. The first is
that it enforces the original expectations of the parties, preventing one party

from attempting a unilateral, post-consummation reform of the contract.
Second,

it prevents whipsaw situations.

In Peterson, while whipsaw

prevention was preserved, the court allowed one party to subsequently and

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1007-08.
See id. at 990, 991 (majority opinion).
See id at 1001 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in

part).
154. Professor Emily Cauble suggests one explanation for this lopsided nature is
evidentiary consideration. However, she also asserts this explanation is a flawed justification for
three reasons. Cauble, supra note 11, at 458-60.
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unilaterally reform the contract.' 55 This is contrary to the first justification.
Moreover, as the dissent noted, sometimes whipsaw litigation is necessary and
beneficial rather than something to be universally avoided.15 6
It makes-or at least it should make-little difference that the mechanism
for post-consummation reformation was pursuant to an antecedent granting of
consent. Such consent is not meaningful and certainly not powerful enough to
automatically bind parties for tax purposes to any and all post hoc
reformations. As commentators note:
The common thread which unites [a] group [of cases where taxpayers
successfully assert substance over form] is the factor that the form of
the transaction was either not wanted or not controlled by the
taxpayer. Thus, the rationalization that taxpayers cannot be heard to
complain of the consequences of their choice loses much of its
force.1 57
The Peterson fact pattern is exactly the type of scenario described-the
taxpayer does not actively choose the form of the transaction, and thus should
not be bound to it.
On a practical level, Peterson significantly expands the scope of the
Danielson rule and its long-term ramifications are not entirely clear yet.

Certainly, parties should exercise caution in dealing with contracts that
contain a unilateral amendment clause. Even though sometimes considered
illusory, parties should contemplate savings clauses.1 58 However, the
foregoing considerations are pointless in the context of contracts of adhesion
like the one in Peterson.
V. CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Circuit should have declined to reach a result relying on the
Danielson rule based on the fact pattern of Peterson, and other circuits should

decline as well.
Combining contracts of adhesion with both unilateral amendment clauses
and the Danielson rule elevates form to untouchable levels-providing the

IRS with the strict standard it always sought. Elements of "mistake, undue

155. Peterson, 827 F.3d at 994 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the
judgment in part).
156. See supra Part III.A.
157. Donaldson, supra note 7, at 48.
158. Although it was not discussed, an implicit assumption in the opinions is that there
was no savings clause that would have allowed Peterson to object or otherwise terminate the
agreement in the face of an unsatisfactory unilateral amendment.
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influence, fraud, duress, etc."1 59 simply are not relevant in these contexts.
There is no justification sound enough to allow for application of the
Danielson rule in a post hoc unilateral amendment for which one party cannot
meaningfully consent. The Danielson rule, as well as other non-disavowal

doctrines, should be appropriately constrained. At a bare minimum, contracts
of adhesion and changes due to unilateral amendment clauses should not bind
a subordinate party for tax purposes.

159. Comm'rv. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967).
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